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The first step toward a modern understanding of fMRI resting brain activity was made
by Bharat Biswal in 1995. This surprising, and at first rejected, discovery is now
associated with many resting state networks, notably the famous default mode network
(DMN). Resting state activity and DMN significantly reassessed our traditional beliefs
and conventions about the functioning of the brain. For the majority of the twentieth
century, neuroscientists assumed that the brain is mainly the “reactive engine” to the
environment operating mostly through stimulation. This “reactive convention” was very
influential and convenient for the goals of twentieth century neuroscience–non-invasive
functional localization based on stimulation. Largely unchallenged, “reactive convention”
determined the direction of scientific research for a long time and became the “reactive
paradigm” of the twentieth century. Resting state activity brought knowledge that was
quite different of the “reactive paradigm.” Current research of the DMN, probably the
best known resting state network, leads to entirely new observations and conclusions,
which were not achievable from the perspective of the “reactive paradigm.” This shift
from reactive activity to resting state activity of the brain is accompanied by an important
question: “Can resting state activity be considered a scientific revolution and the new
paradigm of neuroscience, or is it only significant for one branch of neuroscience, such
as fMRI?”
Keywords: scientific revolution, reactive paradigm, intrinsic activity, resting state activity, default mode network,
evoked brain activity, fMRI
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
It is impossible to deal with the question posed above without even a basic understanding of the
terms scientific revolution and paradigm. American physicist and philosopher of science Thomas
S. Kuhn brought to the philosophy of science one of the most fundamental concepts, which is
often used not only by philosophers of science. This concept is a paradigm and it is tightly linked
to Kuhn’s hypothesis about the development of scientific knowledge. According to Kuhn’s ideas,
development of scientific knowledge is not continuous as one may presume, but is formed through
major upheavals in scientific beliefs. Such major upheavals are called scientific revolutions that are
accompanied by a change of the paradigm.
The paradigm determines the direction of research, it determines the problem and the methods
to its solution and it also refers to the generally accepted beliefs, results and findings of the scientific
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community about the relevance and importance of the problem.
The paradigm determines the so-called normal science, which
is a specific period where scientists work under the weight
of the current paradigm, and their research is characterized
by the cumulating of relevant data. A cumulative process of
research is intended to deepen and to shield the current paradigm
rather than to seek out new problems or topics that could be
investigated and researched. However, during this cumulative
process special kinds of phenomena begin to appear–anomalies.
These phenomena cannot be explained by the existing paradigm
and for some time are usually ignored. After some time, however,
repeatedly observable anomalies that resist scientific explanation
begin to gain strength, and they lead to a period of crisis.
A period of crisis is caused by the inability of the paradigm
(and the methods of normal science) to deal with the anomalies,
which leads to the emergence of new hypotheses and theories that
try to deal with anomalies and thus this period is characterized
by the presence of many new theories that attempt to explain
them. Only one of these new theories will become a generally
acceptable solution and eventually a new paradigm. The process
of replacement of one paradigm by another is called a scientific
revolution.
This process of replacing one paradigm with a more adequate
paradigm is repeated. Selection of a paradigm does not solely
depend on rational values, but according to Kuhn it also depends
on the social elements within the scientific community, which
decide whether the new theory is adequate or not. Selecting
a new paradigm, therefore, also includes negotiations in the
scientific community, the strength of the scientific authority or
the trendiness of the upcoming paradigm.
REACTIVE PARADIGM
The so-called “reactive paradigm” began in the second half of
the nineteenth century and was dominant during the twentieth
century. “Reactive paradigm” could be roughly described as a
belief that the functioning of the central nervous system is based
mainly on reactive functions to the external environment (Llinás,
2002; Raichle and Snyder, 2007).
One of the first proponents of this model was James
(1890/1950), who assumed that organization of the central
nervous system is based reflexively. In this view, the brain is
a tool that generates specific outputs to the inputs coming
from the external environment. Sherrington (1906) also expected
that the whole central nervous system is based on reflexive
functioning and is, therefore, always busy with stimuli coming
from the external environment. Some ideas resembling the
reactive functioning, can also be found in works of Santiago
Ramón y Cajal, the father of modern neuroscience. Cajal
described several laws of nervous system, such as the law of
avalanche conduction. This law says that even small but well-
defined stimuli can cause the activation of large and distant
populations of neurons to generate appropriate responses (Llinás,
2003; Delgado-García, 2015). Another is the law of unity of spatial
and tonal perception. This law describes the need of central
nervous system to generate integrated and united perception,
which corresponds to the stimuli of the external world. Some
ideas of reactive functioning could also be found in Cajal’s
interpretation of pyramidal cells. Pyramidal cells are capable of
storing sensory information from the external world, which can
be used for later responses (Delgado-García, 2015). Loeb (1912)
can also be mentioned as one of the proponents of this reactive
idea. During his scientific career, Loeb concluded that there is no
free will and all animals including people are mechanisms, and
their behavior is just a result of physical and chemical reactions
to environmental stimuli.
Such ideas about the nature of brain functioning were
very suitable for the former goal of neuroscience–functional
localization, the revealing of the functions of the specific brain
areas. We can mention works of Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke
on expressive and receptive aphasia. Experiments performed
by Eduard Hitzig and Gustav Fritsch with electrical stimulation
of various areas of the dog’s cerebral cortex, Hermann Munk’s
localization of vision within the occipital cortex, David Ferrier’s
localization of cortical areas responsible for motor functions
and many others can also be mentioned. Further support of
functional localization was also given by the formulation of the
neuron doctrine (nervous system ismade up of discrete individual
cells) of Santiago Ramón y Cajal, whose ideas and experiments
helped to abandon the reticular theory of Joseph von Gerlach and
Camillo Golgi (Finger, 2001; Delgado-García, 2015).
In the second half of the twentieth century, invasive
experiments on animals were largely replaced by non-invasive
observation methods that finally allowed observation of the
actual functioning of the human brain; however, the reactive
idea and motivation of functional localization remained. Most
of the knowledge and the conclusions about the functions
of specific neural regions stem from non-invasive studies of
the twentieth century. The methodology of these studies was
based on correlations between neural activations and specific
stimulation, cognitive or motor functions. The tradition of non-
invasive studies and their wide success deepened the common
belief that the brain is mainly a reactive instrument to the external
environment.
Even though there were ideas that questioned the direct
reactive functioning of the brain, other theories can be named
that supported this belief. For example, the influential theory
of American psychologist James J. Gibson. Gibson claimed that
endogenously generated inferences are unnecessary postulates
in normal perception and the external world, and its objects
are perceived directly, not endogenously inferred. Influenced by
radical empiricism, Gibson even claimed that the contents of
cognition are the responses of the body to the world (Hochberg,
1994).
Similar tendencies of reactive functioning can also be found
in the history of cognitive science. After the fall of behaviorism,
which treated the mind as a “black box,” cognitive science
was at its beginning deeply influenced by a computational
approach to themind and the brain. The computational approach
or computational paradigm of cognitive science regarded the
mind/brain as a computing system similar to the Turingmachine,
which operates through symbolic processing. The mind (and the
brain) works on the basis of inputs (stimulation) and outputs
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 7
Havlík From Anomalies to Essential Scientific Revolution?
(motor responses). In my view, the functioning of the mind and
brain based on inputs and outputs with pure symbolic operations
support the idea of “reactive paradigm.”
After two decades, around 1980, the computational approach
to the mind (and the brain) was challenged by connectionism
(although some argued that connectionism is absolutely
compatible with computationalism). Connectionism moved
away from computational ideas of the mind toward artificial
neural networks, which consist of simple units and their links.
The main strength of connectionism lies in the fact that it is
close to the actual brain that consists of neurons and synapses.
Networks can learn from their environment and generally
represent natural mechanisms. It is not computation that is
making the appropriate responses but various networks that
cooperate with each other. Even though connectionism became
more attractive than the computational approach the main idea
of functioning remained the same–input and output. Building
blocks of connectionism are processing units, input units, output
units, and hidden units. Input units are understood as units
responsible for receiving inputs from sources external to the
network. Output units are responsible for the outcomes coming
from the network and hidden units are those that communicate
only with other units within the network. Connectionism
introduced a much more natural way of thinking about the mind
(and brain) than the computational approach; however, the main
idea of the “reactive approach” largely remained untouched.
During this long scientific period of brain and mind, the
neuroscientific community operated mostly within the context of
evoked brain activity (stimulation–response/input–output) and
intrinsic brain states were largely ignored.
HISTORY OF INTRINSIC BRAIN ACTIVITY
Intrinsic brain activity (also known as resting state activity) refers
to the neural states that are produced spontaneously by the brain
and not as responses to stimulation or immediate reactions to the
environment. According to Raichle, intrinsic activity represents
baseline neuronal activity or the so-called default mode of the
brain associated with a high rate of energy consumption. Baseline
in this context refers to the physiological baseline of brain
activity, which is defined as the absence of activation–increase of
blood flow (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). Next to the baseline, no
more than 5% of energy consumption is associated with reactive
aspects of the brain functioning or so-called evoked brain activity
(Raichle and Mintun, 2006; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Raichle,
2009, 2015).
The whole scientific program of intrinsic activity started with
Bharat Biswal and Gordon L. Shulman. Biswal’s discovery of
coherent resting activity of the sensorimotor cortex was based
on his investigation of the various noise sources present in
the brain and their changes between rest and task (Biswal,
2012). During the experiment, subjects went through several
resting states and various forms of finger tapping (Biswal et al.,
1995). Low-frequency signal was present in addition to the
cardiac and respiratory signal, which was the first step to
describing a significant correlation between the left and right
sensorimotor cortices during rest (Biswal et al., 1995; Biswal,
2012). Conclusions of this paper had a significant impact,
which was later visible in studies that demonstrated the resting
functional connectivity of various sensory cortices (Hampson
et al., 2002, 2004).
Independently of Biswal, Gordon L. Shulman et al. (1997)
proposed two interesting ideas. Firstly, active tasks accompanied
by blood flow increases apparently require consistent inhibition
of the same areas (posterior cingulate/precuneus). Secondly, these
decreases in activity during tasks with high probability lead to
an absence of processes present during passive/rest conditions,
such as monitoring of the external environment (later known
as the Sentinel hypothesis), unconstrained thought processes
(now known as various self-referential thoughts), monitoring
body states, monitoring emotional states, and also creating
the Self. According to Schulman’s paper, one of the areas
that showed consistent decreases during active tasks was the
posterior cingulate/precuneus (Shulman et al., 1997). This area
was nicknamed the medial mystery parietal area (Raichle and
Snyder, 2007) and is now considered the central region of
default mode network (DMN) (Fransson and Marrelec, 2008;
Utevsky and Smith, 2014), probably the best known resting
state network consisting of the posterior cingulate/precuneus and
medial prefrontal cortex, which represent its core regions.
Since this time, many resting state networks have been
identified along with their structural connectivity, such as
parietal-frontal networks, the primary motor network, the visual
network, extra-striate visual networks and others (see van
den Heuvel et al., 2009). A great deal of attention is now
focused on the recently discovered salience network (SN), which
consists of the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex.
Main functions of the SN lie in “detecting salience stimuli”
and “dynamical switching” between the other two large scale
networks–the DMN and the central executive network (CEN),
which is associated with evoked brain activity (Menon and
Uddin, 2010). And also the recently described parietal memory
network (PMN) consisting of the precuneus and the medial
cingulate cortex. The PMN is supposed to be active when familiar
stimuli are presented and deactivated when novel stimuli are to
be remembered (Gilmore et al., 2015). But no other resting state
network has made such significant impact on the neuroscientific
community and helped establish resting brain activity as a
prosperous neuroscientific theme as the DMN.
DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
The DMN has been an interesting and topical theme in
neuroscience since the beginning of the twenty first century.
Based on the PubMed search in 2015, more than 600 studies have
been published that deal with the behavior of the DMN. This
network is currently characterized as a large-scale resting brain
network consisting of specific brain regions: medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC),medial
and lateral temporal cortex (m/lTC), posterior inferior parietal
lobule (pIPL), and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC).
The very nature of the DMN is that it is highly active and
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highly functionally connected during passive states that can
be achieved by behavioral rest. The first idea of this resting
state network was established based on regular observations
of identical decreases in the activity of the mPFC and PCC
when subjects went from a passive resting state into states of
reactive or evoked cognition (Raichle et al., 2001). Reactive
states are described as states of evoked activity that are induced
by stimulation or are present during states of active attention,
which is necessary for immediately responding to the demands
of the environment. These states of evoked activity are bound
to another large scale brain network, the so-called (CEN),
which, by the nature of its activity, is in anti-correlation
with the intrinsic activity of the DMN, meaning if one is
active then the other is partially disengaged and vice versa
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle
et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007). Interestingly, novel
computation approaches to resting state fMRI (still relatively new
method of functional brain imaging used for the observation of
spontaneous regional interactions, which occur when a subject
is not performing an explicit task) analysis were introduced
at the same time. Methods, such as seed-driven functional
connectivity or independent component analysis (ICA) allow us
to identify and quantify resting brain networks (including DMN)
in any fMRI time series even without the condition of task-
dependent deactivation. Interesting observations were reported
about the connectivity of the regions of the DMN. Connectivity
of DMN is in fact formed successively through the development
of the individual and within its ontogenesis (Fair et al., 2008).
This fact was also demonstrated by an fMRI study focusing
on infants. Fransson et al. (2007) found several resting brain
networks; however, they failed to detect a direct equivalent of
the DMN, hypothesizing that the absence of the DMN could be
related to the immaturity of the infant brain (Fransson et al.,
2007).
The default mode of brain function (Raichle et al., 2001) and
the so-called baseline of neural activity (Gusnard and Raichle,
2001) were described in 2001. A study was published shortly
afterwards focusing on the functional connectivity of default
mode, which claimed that this intrinsic activity is in fact a highly
connective functional brain network–the DMN (Greicius et al.,
2003). This was quite surprising because until then only the
motor and sensory networks had been discovered (by researches
of the reactive paradigm) and the existence of resting state
networks was almost entirely out of the question (Raichle and
Snyder, 2007). In addition, the idea that deactivations of a passive
state, used in most cases only for the contrast to the reactive
experiments, would probably hide the most important network
of the human brain was very unlikely. But soon after the studies
showed that the DMN exists, it became a “matter of fashion”
that could not be ignored by any neuroscientific laboratory. The
fact that no special equipment is needed to measure resting
states of the brain also played an important role. Subjects are
only asked to stay in a state of behavioral rest. Furthermore,
it was only a matter of time until intrinsic activity and the
DMN were incorporated into ongoing research programs with
various different objectives and themes. In this paper, we will
describe these research programs with the assistance of Kuhn’s
philosophy, in order to answer the question whether the DMN is
a new paradigm of neuroscience.
THE RESTING STATE AND THE DMN IN
THE LIGHT OF KUHN’S PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
Resting brain activity and the DMN became very interesting
topics in twenty first century neuroscience. Marcus Raichle
admitted that the DMN generated a much greater interest than
he ever expected (Raichle and Snyder, 2007). In the following
text, we will describe how the DMN and its subsequent research
revolutionized our understanding of the brain and we will also
analyze whether resting state activity corresponds to the model
of Thomas S. Kuhn and whether it can be considered a new
paradigm of neuroscience.
There are several conditions that a new paradigm has to fulfill.
One of them is the promise of success of a new paradigm:
“The success of a paradigm–whether Aristotle’s analysis of
motion, Ptolemy’s computations of planetary position, Lavoisier’s
application of the balance, or Maxwell’s mathematization of the
electromagnetic field–is at the start largely a promise of success
discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal
science consists in the actualization of that promise [...] (Kuhn,
1962, pp. 23–24).”
The promise of success is essential for a new paradigm and the
new paradigm has to immediately begin to fulfill such promise.
In this case, the promise is related to the progress of our
understanding of brain functioning and progress in themes that
are yet to be explained. The condition of the success of a new
paradigm has begun to be fulfilled immediately after the claim
that intrinsic activity represents the baseline of neural activity
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Describing the
baseline of neural activity essential for any other brain activity is
in itself a great success; however, the greatest promise of success
of the DMN and intrinsic activity is through the acquisition of
more knowledge about mental and neurodegenerative disorders.
This was maybe the most vital reason why the DMN stole
the fame from Biswal’s original paper. For a long time, the
neuroscientific community looked at the brain differently than
it does now. Neuroscientists thus unintentionally neglected the
important manifestations of mental disorders in the resting
state activity of the brain. Currently, it is common knowledge
that various disorders alter the functioning of the DMN. All
of the studies that connect the DMN with psychiatric and
neurodegenerative disorders describe atypical functioning of the
DMN (Buckner, 2012), which manifests itself as an increased or
decreased activity or functional integrity of the brain regions that
form this resting state network. Important discoveries were made
for Alzheimer’s disease, schizophrenia and depression (see e.g.,
Greicius et al., 2007; Broyd et al., 2009).
Relative to controls, patients diagnosed with Alzheimer’s
disease have reduced DMN activity particularly in the PCC and
medial temporal lobe (Greicius et al., 2004). Another resting
state fMRI study presented interesting behavior of the right
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hippocampus in patients with Alzheimer’s, namely its reduced
functional connectivity of the nodes of the DMN (Wang et al.,
2006). Resting state fMRI and observation of intrinsic activity
can also be quite successful (another promise of success) for
the early recognition of the onset of a neural disease. Early
determination of neural biomarkers for various disorders is one
of the most important things for further treatment. Individuals
with mild cognitive impairment can be differentiated from
healthy individuals by the degree of deactivation of the DMN
regions MFG, precuneus/PCC and anterior cingulate gyrus
(Rombouts et al., 2005). A similar differentiation between mildly
cognitively impaired individuals and patients diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease can be made based on differences in the
deactivation of the anterior cingulate cortex (Rombouts et al.,
2005). Several authors also try to put the DMN into context with
genetic predispositions to Alzheimer’s disease. The hypothesis is
that from a genetic perspective people with the risk of Alzheimer’s
diseases have a much lower ability to deactivate the DMN
(Persson et al., 2008).
According to resting state study of patients diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia, both large-scale networks, the DMN
and CEN, exhibit increased connectivity. According to the
study, such increased connectivity could hypothetically correlate
with increased sensitivity to the external environment and
self-referential thoughts (Zhou et al., 2007). Furthermore, an
explanation of hallucinatory experiences during schizophrenia
could be linked to the increased connectivity between the
DMN and other resting state brain networks (Jafri et al.,
2008). Wang et al. (2015) claim that the DMN plays a
pivotal role in schizophrenia. By dividing the DMN into
three subsystems, i.e., anterior, posterior and lateral DMNs,
they were able to observe atypical connectivity between
various networks and subsystems of DMNs. For example,
intra-default functional connectivity between the anterior and
lateral DMNs was significantly increased in schizophrenic
patients, and lateral DMN exhibited decreased functional
connectivity with unimodal cortical networks and increased
functional connectivity with heteromodal cortical networks.
Lateral DMN also showed increased functional connectivity
with the right control network, which significantly correlated
with PANSS (positive and negative syndrome scale) negative
and, furthermore, lateral DMN exhibited significant functional
connectivity decreases with unimodal systems, including the
somatomotor, motor, lateral visual, and auditory networks, in
schizophrenic patients. According to the results of the study,
based on the DMN connectivity patterns, schizophrenic patients
can be differentiated from normal subjects with 76.9% accuracy
(Wang et al., 2015).
The resting state and the DMN also exhibit atypical behavior
in patients with major depression. According to a resting state
study, the higher activity of the subgenual cingulum negatively
contributes to the natural activity of the DMN. The increases
in activity are shown to be proportional to the length of
the depressive episode. In addition, higher connectivity of
the thalamus and limbic system was observed in individuals
diagnosed with major depression. Authors assume that these
factors have a negative influence on the brain areas responsible
for the various cognitive processes (Greicius et al., 2007), and
that hyperactivity of limbic regions could be caused by reduced
effective connectivity from the anterior subsystem to the ventral
subsystem of the DMN (Sambataro et al., 2013).
But these three most widespread disorders are not the only
themes to connect psychopathology with the atypical functioning
of the DMN and intrinsic activity. Various DMN dysfunctions
were found in patients with Parkinson’s disease. A comparison
between patients with Parkinson’s disease and healthy controls
showed a decrease in the functional connectivity of the right
medial temporal lobe and the bilateral inferior parietal cortex
within the DMN (Tessitore et al., 2012). Individuals diagnosed
with ADHD are unable to suppress DMN activity during most of
the test trials (Metin et al., 2015). Several studies demonstrated
that individuals with autism have lower functional connectivity
between frontal parts of the DMN, PCC and MTL (core regions
of the DMN) compared to healthy individuals (Monk et al.,
2009; Weng et al., 2010; Menon, 2011; Jung et al., 2014). Large
decreases of functional connectivity across many large-scale
brain networks, including the precuneus (the central region of the
DMN), were reported in patients with fragile X syndrome (Hall
et al., 2013).
Despite the fact intrinsic activity can be related to many
disorders, its role in medical diagnosis and medical practice is
currently a modest one. It is not only the problem of intrinsic
activity but the entire fMRI, which is still seldom used in medical
practice. The use of fMRI is growing in the context of presurgical
planning, but in the routine medical practice, such as diagnosis of
psychiatric disorders, the use of fMRI as a diagnostic tool is still
largely missing (Rosen and Savoy, 2012).
Another promise of success of intrinsic activity and the DMN
can be seen in studies of consciousness, which still represents
the most enigmatic topic in neuroscience, neurophilosophy and
the philosophy of the mind. Recent findings show that the
activity of regions of the DMN is in direct correlation with levels
of consciousness. Connectivity of the DMN reflects the level
of consciousness, ranging from healthy controls to minimally
conscious, vegetative and comatose patients (Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2010). Success in revealing information about the DMN
and its relation to the consciousness leads some to the idea that
the intrinsic activity of the brain could be used to finally resolve
the enigmatic problem of the conscious experience.
Consciousness is not the only theme of philosophically
oriented questions of the mind in which the DMN promises
success. Role of the DMN is also considered in the ongoing mental
phenomena that are present during intrinsic activity. However,
research of mental phenomena has been significantly delayed
by the definition of the DMN. The DMN was characterized as
a resting brain network, which decreases its activity when the
subject enters into a state of active cognition. Such a definition
of intrinsic activity has led to the general belief that if the
subject began to produce any kind of active cognition, it would
interrupt intrinsic neural activity. “It lulled us into focusing on
the default network’s attenuation during most active tasks, and
it took several years before ideas on the default network’s role
in active cognition were brought to the forefront. And that’s
when things got really interesting” (Buckner, 2012, p. 1142).
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After this, various researches determined that intrinsic activity
is in relation to self-referential thinking (Gusnard and Raichle,
2001), imagining the future (Buckner et al., 2008), spontaneous
cognition (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).mind wandering (Mason
et al., 2007), remembering the past and imagining the future
(Addis et al., 2007), mental time travel (Østby et al., 2012), social
cognition (Mars et al., 2012), theory of mind (Buckner et al.,
2008; Nekovarova et al., 2014), internal train of thought produced
by cooperation between the DMN and frontal-parietal network
(Smallwood et al., 2012) etc., which have the overall character of
spontaneous imagination or daydreaming. Current interest lies
in the questioners of spontaneous cognition that try to capture
the form and content of these mental states (Delamillieure et al.,
2010; Diaz et al., 2013, 2014; Gorgolewski et al., 2014).
The questions of neural etiology began to arise after the claim
that activity of the DMN represents a functional baseline of
neural activity. The first question was: which region is the central
region of the DMN? From the onset, the precuneus was the
main candidate because it takes about 35% more glucose than
other neural regions in the brain, which puts it in first place
on the scale of metabolic activity of the DMN (Gusnard and
Raichle, 2001). Nowadays, most contemporary neuroscientists
consider the precuneus/PCC to be the central region of the
DMN (Fransson and Marrelec, 2008; Utevsky and Smith, 2014).
Another question of neural etiology arose a few years later.
In this case, the focus was on the relation between two anti-
correlated brain networks, the DMN and the CEN. Research has
shown that the function of the SN is to find the salient stimuli
and subsequently deactivate the DMN and activate the CEN,
which was described as “dynamical switching” between these two
large scale networks (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Further success
of the DMN can be seen in the subsequent research that put
together the SN, DMN and CEN and led to the formulation of
the so-called Triple network theory. The triple network theory
also promises success in answering questions about psychical
disorders because dysfunction of its mechanisms is considered
to be the underlying condition of several neurological and
psychiatric disorders (Menon, 2011; Nekovarova et al., 2014).
The DMN also promises some success in the topic of
localization of specific ongoing mental states. An interesting
study was performed by Demis Hassabis. The goal of this
particular experiment was to show where modules for people
and their personalities are stored. Experiment was based on
the predicting behavior of specific people in specific locations
during the phases of resting states. The results showed that
personalities of other people can be localized in the medial
temporal lobes, the posterior inferior parietal lobule, the
PCC, and mPFC–central nodes of the DMN (Hassabis et al.,
2013).
The various successes lead us to ask whether the DMN is solely
a human neural system. Recent findings documented that the
DMN can also be found in monkeys and rodents (Mantini et al.,
2011; Lu et al., 2012), which could have important implications
for evolutionary biology in the future.
Promise of success is not the only thing that defines a new
paradigm. Scientific revolution is accompanied by a change in
the “neuroscientific worldview.” We can never look at the brain
in the same way as before–only from the perspective of reactive
brain functioning.
In his work, Kuhn says:
“Each (scientific revolution) produced a consequent shift in the
problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards
by which the profession determined what should count as an
admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each
(scientific revolution) transformed the scientific imagination in
ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation
of the world [...]” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 6).
and
“(W)hen paradigms change, the world itself changes with them.
Led by a new paradigm, scientist adopt new instruments and look
in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists
see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments
in places they have looked before. [...] (P)aradigm changes do cause
scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently.
[...] What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution
are rabbits afterwards” (Kuhn, 1962, p.111).
In the previous section, we described a reactive paradigm
that was based on the widespread conviction that the brain
is a mainly reactive engine to the environment. Research of
reactive brain functions brought important conclusions about
functional localization and its success unintentionally caused the
neglect of the resting states. The discovery of intrinsic brain
activity significantly updated our research of brain functioning.
According to several authors, reactive experiments revealed only
a small portion of the actual brain functioning (Gusnard and
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007).
When neuroscientists now look at the brain they do not primarily
see reactive functions of the brain. Their world came through
the crucial transformation that is now clearly visible in the
acceptance of the fact that the brain has significant intrinsic
activity. Revolutionary changes can be seen in the current
neuroscientific research programs, and also can be observed
explicitly in the critical language of current neuroscientists, who
openly speak about the long-term omission of resting brain states.
It is possible to cite several authors that share this conviction.
Samantha Broyd on one occasion said: “For researchers to focus
on active task-oriented conditions to the exclusion of rest may
be a significant oversight” (Broyd et al., 2009, p. 280). Marcus
Raichle also said that: “Unfortunately, the success of studying
evoked activity has caused us to lose sight of the possibility
that our experiments reveal only a small fraction of the actual
functional activity performed by our brain” (Raichle, 2010,
p. 180).
An important part of Kuhn’s philosophy is played by
anomalies:
“New and unsuspected phenomena are, however, repeatedly
uncovered by scientific research, [...]” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 52).
The very idea of the existence of intrinsic brain activity was based
on the observation of a specific recurring anomaly. It is possible
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to attribute the status of the anomaly to the dominant source
of noise (low frequency fluctuations), which Biswal observed as
an addition to the cardiac and respiratory signal. The finding
such an anomaly was not received with enthusiasm. Biswal (2012)
in his personal review says that “one audience member (who
shall remain nameless —but who is now heavily involved in
resting-state connectivity research!) suggested that I, along with
my research, should be buried since this would destroy fMRI.”
This corresponds with Kuhn’s idea that novelties are not welcome
during the phase of normal science.
In the case of Shulman et al. (1997) and Raichle, anomalies can
be connected to the recurring decrease of activity in the posterior
cingulate/precuneus, whichwas called themedial mystery parietal
area (Raichle and Snyder, 2007). Decreases of activity in the
medial mystery parietal area were related to what is now known
as the anti-correlate relation between the CEN and DMN,
observable in moments when the subject goes from a passive
resting state to states of reactive or experimentally stimulated
cognition. However, the phenomenon of repeated reduction in
neural activity was not an isolated observation. Most laboratories
commonly observed such a deactivation, but these data have
been systematically overlooked as is natural for the phase of
normal science. This anomaly, which became the first step toward
the description of the DMN, had no vital interpretation in
the “reactive” paradigm. Since the previous tradition focused
primarily on reactive aspects of neural activity, these frequent
anomalies were unintentionally but largely overlooked. Randy L.
Buckner mentioned in his review how the absence of clarification
of this anomaly did not allow researchers to see the activity of
the DMN: “Anyone conducting a human neuroimaging study
that uses a passive baseline as a control will observe the default
network if they look [...]. We documented its presence across
four different contrasts but, having little grasp of its importance
only noted, ‘Although the fixation task was intended as a low-
level control task, it nevertheless may require distinct processing
resources”’ (Buckner et al., 1995; Buckner, 2012, p. 1138).
Kuhn also says about the new paradigm:
“[...] new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large
part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has accrued to
science through its predecessors. Novelty for its own sake is not
a desideratum in the sciences as it is in so many other creative
fields. As a result, though new paradigms seldom or never possess
all the capabilities of their predecessors, they usually preserve a
great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievement and
they always permit additional concrete problem-solutions besides”
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 169).
Nevertheless, the resting state does not exclude or naively falsify
the results and observations of previous studies that fall under
the “reactive” paradigm. The arrival of intrinsic activity and the
DMN and their incorporation into specific research programs in
no way precluded observations of reactive activations of brain
regions. Furthermore, intrinsic activity is not tied to a specific
method of measurement. It is observed in the same manner as
brain functions that require active attention and evoked activity,
i.e., using non-invasive methods, such as functional magnetic
resonance imaging or positron emission tomography. Intrinsic
activity retains the results of the previous paradigm, which can be
easily replicated using cognitive tasks requiring active attention.
Therefore, it could be considered that reactive functions of
the brain are explainable from specific resting conditions that
constitute an integrated neural baseline. Kuhn says that: “Though
an out-of-date theory can always be viewed as a special case of
its up-to-date successor, it must be transformed for the purpose”
(102–103). The question as to whether resting state/intrinsic
brain activity is a new paradigm of neuroscience could be
answered simply if there was a universal consensus on looking at
evoked brain activity as a special case of intrinsic brain activity.
Raichle showed that the functioning of the baseline is related to
high energy consumption and according to him evoked brain
states exceed this high-energy consumption by no more than 5%
(Raichle andMintun, 2006; Raichle, 2009, 2015). Raichel’s finding
could be used to support the idea that evoked brain states are
actually special cases of baseline activity.
“(T)here can be small revolutions as well as large ones, [...] some
revolutions affect only themembers of a professional subspecialty,
and that for such groups even the discovery of a new and
unexpected phenomenon may be revolutionary. [...] For the rest
of the profession and for those who practice other physical
sciences, that change need not be revolutionary at all” (Kuhn,
1962, pp. 49–50).
There is no question that the resting state had a revolutionary
impact on neuroscience. Its research brought new knowledge
of various neuropsychiatric disorders, functional connectivity
processes and brought attention to the spontaneous mental
phenomena. Various resting networks were discovered with their
structural connections, and a correlation between the DMN and
various levels of consciousness was also shown. According to
some, resting state functional connectivity is highly reliable tool
for gathering valuable pre-surgical information. It can be used
during a patient’s sleep or sedation and thus does not require the
patient’s cooperation, which is crucial for evoked fMRI (Shimony
et al., 2009). Others even consider the resting state to be a more
proficient tool than evoked brain activity for revealing more
functional connections (Xiong et al., 1998, 1999; Biswal, 2012).
Under the pressure of these ideas, various new discoveries
described in this review and with a seductive metaphor that
evoked activity represents only the tip of the iceberg of the total
activity of the brain, it is possible to state that intrinsic activity was
a large scientific revolution and a new paradigm of neuroscience.
However, this idea is not tenable at all.
AGAINST THE IDEA OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTION
Even though some aspects of resting activity correspond well
with several of Kuhn’s ideas, there are some elements of Kuhn’s
philosophy that intrinsic activity does not satisfy.
During the period of the reactive paradigm, neuroscientists
concentrated on their own research of reactive aspects of brain
areas. During this period, the anomalies (noise/low frequency
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signal, deactivations of the medial “mysterious” parietal area)
were overlooked in most cases, which is typical for a phase
of normal science that does not identify novelties. However,
recurring anomalies did not induce a phase of crisis in normal
science and did not present a major problem that would threaten
the reactive paradigm. Observable anomalies, therefore, did not
spark a scientific revolution. Resting state activity and the DMN
came to neuroscience as an explanation of these anomalies and
not as the winners of a crisis in neuroscience.
Furthermore, another aspect of the scientific revolution did
not appear. According to Kuhn, the inability of the former
paradigm to deal with anomalies leads to the emergence of new
hypotheses and theories. By explaining anomalies, these new
theories strive to become the new paradigm. Nothing like this
happened in the short history of intrinsic activity. There was no
emergence of another hypothesis and the DMN was not one of
themany theories that would try to explain observable anomalies.
Thus, again, resting state activity and the DMN cannot be
considered as the winners in the competition of the various
explanatory hypotheses because such hypotheses were not even
formulated.
On the basis of this analysis, one should adopt a skeptical
attitude toward the idea that intrinsic activity is a fully fledged
scientific revolution and a new paradigm of neuroscience. On
the other hand, taking into account the success, progress and
deepening of knowledge about the brain due to intrinsic activity
(and the DMN), it is seductive to conclude that resting brain
activity presents a new paradigm of neuroscience even though
it does not exactly match the phases described by Kuhn. Now,
an interesting question should be asked: is it possible to consider
intrinsic activity as a significant scientific revolution even though
it happened without the phase of crisis in the normal science of
a reactive paradigm? I propose the following: intrinsic activity
could be understood as a new paradigm of neuroscience if and
only if two conditions are satisfied. Firstly, there has to be a
universal consensus that understands any evoked brain state
as a special case of intrinsic activity and that any such state is
explainable from states of intrinsic activity. Secondly, intrinsic
activity had to absolutely break from the history of neuroscience
and establish a completely new and unexpected perspective on
how we look at the brain.
Condition 1
The previous section described how baseline activity has a high
rate of energy consumption and evoked brain states exceed this
consumption by no more than 5% (Raichle and Mintun, 2006;
Raichle, 2009, 2015). For some thinkers, it could be seductive
to claim that any activation is a special case of resting state
activity. However, it is very unlikely that the neuroscientific
community would reach a consensus on understanding any
sensory, motor, emotional or higher cognitive function or even
subjective conscious experience as only a special case of intrinsic
activity. It would just stand against natural intuition. Most
probably there are proponents of the idea that all the resting
state and the DMN represent is that everyone doing fMRI has
the same noise, same background fluctuations in their signal, and
everyone analyzes their data with this in mind. Neuroscientists
have just come to understand their signals better. Although it
is certainly progress, it is nothing more than clarification of the
signal and therefore it would be highly misleading to think about
the resting state as a new paradigm of neuroscience. For example,
Morcom and Fletcher (2007) severely criticized resting brain
activity and the concept of the DMN. The authors stated that the
study of rest is not the right choice for studying the functions
of neural regions. Although resting state activity is interesting, it
does not have any special significance. Rather than focusing on
rest, neuroscience should focus on creating more well-designed
cognitive tasks for studying cognition.
It is highly unlikely that evoked brain states (and evoked
activity) would only be understood as a special case of resting
activity. Furthermore, intrinsic activity was never meant to falsify
and replace reactive aspects of the brain in the first place. It is
much more pragmatic and also natural to claim that a reduction
of evoked brain states to intrinsic brain activity is out of the
question and evoked brain states stand next to rest and intrinsic
brain states. This leads to the conclusion that the first condition
cannot be satisfied.
Condition 2
In the twentieth century the common belief, now referred by
many as the central dogma of neuroscience, was that the adult
brain cannot produce any new neurons. In the second half
of the twentieth century several scientists tried to falsify this
deeply rooted neuroscientific belief. First one was Altman (1962)
who showed the evidence of the existence of newly created
neurons in the adult rodent brain. Over the years new neurons
were found in brains of several adult animals, such as rats
(Altman, 1962; Kaplan and Hinds, 1977), cats (Altman, 1963),
Guinea-pigs (Altman andDas, 1967) and Canary birds (Goldman
and Nottebohm, 1983). However, the dogma was still not fully
falsified due to the idea that the proliferation of new neurons is
impossible in adult brains of higher mammals, such as primates
(and humans) (Rakic, 1985). It took the pioneers of neurogenesis
(e.g., Elizabeth Gould, Fred Gage, Peter S. Eriksson) another
decade to overcome this idea. In 1997, relation between enriched
environment and new neurons in dentate gyrus of adult mice
was shown (Kempermann et al., 1997). Later the effects of
exercise (running) on the proliferation of cells in dentate gyrus
of adult mice were described (van Praag et al., 1999). In 1998,
Peter S. Eriksson and Fred Gage were the first who documented
the existence of new neurons in the hippocampi of several
adult human brains (Eriksson et al., 1998) and 1 year later,
Elizabeth Gould was the first one who proved the existence of
new hippocampal neurons in adult Old World primates (Gould
et al., 1999a). In the same year, she reported the existence of new
neurons in neocortex of adult Macaca fascicularis (Gould et al.,
1999c) and also showed that the number of new cells increases
in dentate gyrus of adult rats in response to associative learning
(Gould et al., 1999b).
Over the years, this dogma of no new neurons in adult brain
has been overcome and replaced by a new paradigm that can be
described as a paradigm of “adult neurogenesis.” A paradigm of
adult neurogenesis is the absolute opposite of its predecessor–
the adult brain is capable of producing new neurons and these
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are born constantly. Revolutions in neuroscience are associated
with a radical reassessment of unquestioned beliefs about the
brain and its functioning. Any such revolution subsequently
leads to progress and success because it significantly deepens our
knowledge and can lead to the solution of problems that resisted
scientific endeavor for far too long due to the persistence of the
previous paradigm. The new paradigm has to radically break
from the history of its predecessor.
Does intrinsic activity radically break from the history of
neuroscience and was the reactive paradigm so persistent that
it would not allow any ideas of intrinsic or endogenous brain
activity? No. There were several ideas that opposed the view of the
simple reactive functioning of the brain. For example, Hermann
von Helmholtz claimed that visual perception is not direct. He
assumed that visual perception is the result of unconscious
inferences from sensory data and knowledge acquired in the
past. Perception is therefore not “directly” related to the external
environment, but it is created endogenously (Gregory, 1997).
Sherrington’s own student Thomas G. Brown broke with ideas
of his mentor when he concluded that the nervous system is
not driven reflexively. He based his belief on observations of
animals with severed afferent pathways. These animals were still
able to generate locomotion even though their afferent pathways
were severed. Such observations led him to the conclusion that
the external environment is not the initiator of these functions
and thus the movement is produced endogenously and not as a
reflexive reaction to the stimulation (Brown, 1911, 1914; Llinás,
2002). Friedrich Goltz, one of the critics of cerebral localization
who believed that intellect cannot be localized within specific
part of the cerebrum, also did not believe in the simplistic
idea that the central nervous system and its behavior function
on a purely reflexive basis (Finger, 2001). If we look at the
history of EEG, Hans Berger was among the first scientists
to describe spontaneous electrical activity in a relaxed resting
state with the eyes closed (Berger, 1929). Another pioneer
in electroencephalography, Adolf Beck, observed spontaneous
electrical brain activity during his experiments with evoked
potentials. Beck further described how spontaneous oscillations
stop after stimulation and are not related to heart and
breathing rhythms (Coenen and Zayachkivska, 2013). These two
pioneers in electroencephalography were not the only ones to
observe spontaneous electrical oscillations (see e.g., Coenen and
Zayachkivska, 2013).
In the light of the above, it cannot be concluded that intrinsic
activity brought a completely new idea about brain activity,
which would radically break from the history of neuroscience and
completely change our understanding of the brain. Therefore, it
does not satisfy the second condition.
CONCLUSION
Although intrinsic activity and the DMN have experienced
great expansion and meet several of Kuhn’s ideas, the idea
that intrinsic activity is the new paradigm of neuroscience
and a large scientific revolution, is untenable. However, the
importance of intrinsic activity for the fMRI cannot be denied
and therefore it may be claimed that the discovery of intrinsic
activity was an essential scientific revolution for the field of
fMRI. Intrinsic activity certainly changed our understanding of
the brain and its activity; however, it cannot be considered as
an all-changing scientific revolution that would replace reactive
thinking about the brain, absolutely break from history of
neuroscience, and determine a completely new view of brain
functioning.
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